Abstract Consumer reviews may have perverse effects, including delays of adoption in new products of unknown quality when consumers are boundedly rational.
Introduction
This paper challenges the general desirability of online reviews for experience products for the society. When consumers have heterogeneous preferences, each review posted reflects both the product's quality and the reviewer's idiosyncratic taste.
With self-selection to buying decisions, reviews become a biased signal on unknown quality. If consumers do not correct for the self-selection, a monopolist may manipulate the posterior beliefs about the quality, because the product price determines self-selection bias. The monopolist faces a trade-off between higher demand today and higher posterior beliefs tomorrow: a higher price today lowers current demand, but intensifies self-selection to buying (only people with high enough idiosyncratic expectation/taste will buy), resulting in higher posterior beliefs tomorrow. We show that the monopolist charges a strictly higher initial price compared to myopic initial price in a setting without reviews, in order to increase bias in the posterior beliefs.
We present a 2-period model, where a monopolist dynamically prices a new experience product of a quality initially unknown to the monopolist and consumers.
Updating of beliefs occurs by observing reviews that are truthfully and automatically posted by all past buyers. While the monopolist is rational, consumers have heterogeneous preferences and are boundedly rational-they do not take into account that reviewers self-select to purchasing decisions-as in the cursed equilibrium of Eyster and Rabin (2005) . The bounded rationality is motivated by Li and Hitt (2008) 's empirical analysis of online book reviews: this suggests that consumers update beliefs as if the reviews reflected their own preferences, despite preference heterogeneity. In cursed equilibrium, agents correctly predict the distribution of actions, but neglect how these actions are correlated with other players' private information. Laboratory experiments (Parloura et al., 2007) as well as real world examples (Brown et al., 2012) show behavior consistent with cursed equilibrium.
We offer another application of such boundedly-rational behavior. This paper is related to literature on the strategic manipulation of the social learning (SL) process. Liu and Schiraldi (2012) , Bhalla (2013) , and Bose et al. (2006 Bose et al. ( , 2 2008 ) analyze a setting where consumers have homogeneous preferences and private information about the unknown value of the product. Pricing decisions may then screen private information. In contrast, our consumers hold identical ex-ante information about quality, but have heterogeneous preferences. The learning does not come from observing purchasing decisions (revealing ex-ante private information) but from observing reviews (revealing ex-post satisfaction). The pricing decision then affects bias in the learning.
In a specific setting of online reviews, Crapis et al. (2015) , and Ifrach et al. (2015) characterize equilibrium dynamics with rational and boundedly rational consumers, respectively. Rather than asking what the dynamics of the learning process are, we ask what distortions in pricing decisions are induced by the existence of reviews. Ifrach et al. (2015) show that 'the optimal dynamic pricing strategy charges a lower price than the corresponding myopic policy, which ignores the effect of pricing on the SL process', since a low price speeds up learning. In contrast, we suggest that the review system also generates incentives for charging a higher initial price than the corresponding initial myopic price.
In a similar setting to ours, Papanastasiou et al. (2014) show that a monopolist, constrained to charging a fixed price, may deliberately under-supply the early demand in order to increase bias in the consumers' posterior beliefs. However, no optimality of such under-supplies remains under dynamic pricing. We analyze a similarly unconstrained model.
In the framework of online reviews, firms may post fake reviews to bias consumers' beliefs (Dellarocas, 2006; Mayzlin et al., 2014) . We show that even if we abstract from such practices, the monopolist is still able to manipulate consumers' beliefs using another tool: the price.
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A monopolist is selling an experience product of unknown quality, with zero marginal costs, over two periods. The monopolist maximizes total undiscounted expected profit by setting price p t ≥ 0 in period t ∈ {1, 2}.
Each period t, a continuum of 1-period-lived consumers of mass one enters the market (unsatisfied demand is not carried over to the next period). Each consumer i purchases the product whenever her expected utility E[u(a, θ i , p t )|θ i , p t ] from purchase is nonnegative, where
q is an unknown common quality, and θ i is a privately known idiosyncratic taste.
Upon purchase, the consumer learns q and automatically posts her experienced quality q + θ i in a public review.
Information: q is initially unknown to the monopolist and consumers. Common prior belief is q ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ). Privately known taste parameters θ i are iid random variables from uniform distribution on [−ε, ε], ε > 0. We denote the random variables and their realizations by the same symbol. In period 2, all agents observe the average of past-period reviews r = E θ [q + θ|µ + θ − p 1 ≥ 0], if there are any, as well as p 1 before taking action.
Consumers have the cursed beliefs of Eyster and Rabin (2005) : each consumer correctly predicts the distribution of other consumers' actions, but do not take into account how these actions are correlated with idiosyncratic tastes. They incorrectly believe that others purchase the product randomly (with actual unconditional probability of purchase) irrespective of their taste, rather than in a way specified by their taste-contingent strategy 1 . The monopolist is rational and aware of the bounded ra-tionality of consumers. Note that since all quality-relevant information is public, there is no signaling issue.
Timing: Nature chooses q. Consumers enter the market and privately learn their θ i 's. The monopolist sets p 1 . Consumers make their purchasing decisions. Anyone buying learns q and posts a review q + θ i . Period 1 ends and all consumers leave the market. New consumers enter the market and privately learn their θ i 's. The average review r from the previous period and p 1 become public. The monopolist sets p 2 . Consumers make purchasing decisions. The game ends.
Cursed posterior beliefs
Self-selection in period 1
If p 1 ≤ µ + ε, consumer i from period 1 buys iff θ i ≥θ 1 (p 1 ), where the threshold
If p 1 > µ + ε, nobody purchases the product.
Given the realization of quality q, the average review r(q, θ 1 (p 1 )), if there is any, is
Rational (Bayesian) updating
Rational agents would account for self-selection. If past reviews exist, they 'de-bias' them appropriately, and recover the realized product quality by taking the inverse of (3). Otherwise, the posterior beliefs coincide with priors (since there is no new information).
Cursed updating
Consumers mistakenly believe that reviews reflect the opinions of an unbiased random sample of the population, i.e., that r(q, θ 1 (p 1 )) = E[q + θ] = q, even though it is determined by (3). If past reviews exist, the cursed posterior belief is
Otherwise, the posterior beliefs coincide with priors (since there is no new information).
Since the monopolist is rational, her posterior beliefs are unbiased. The consumers' cursed posterior beliefs are unbiased only if the demand in period 1 was unity or zero. The monopolist endogenously manipulates the size of the bias through price p 1 (determining the intensity of the self-selection).
3 Inflation of price (b) given a second-period subgame equilibrium for any q (point 1.) and given θ * 1 (p 1 ), p * 1 maximizes the total undiscounted expected profit.
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If µ ≤ −ε, nobody buys at any positive price. If 3ε ≤ µ, heterogeneity is relatively small, compared to µ. The monopolist may find it optimal to satisfy the whole demand of period 1, yielding no bias in q c . A1 ensures a nontrivial case, where the monopolist always sells to a strict subset of consumers in period 1 (heterogeneity matters relatively). Assumption 1. (A1): −ε < µ < 3ε.
Comparing p * 1 to its counterpart charged in a setting without review system, we establish the main result. Proposition 1. Let A1 hold. Then the optimal first-period price is strictly higher in the setting with the reviews than without them.
Proof. Appendix.
Conclusion
This paper illustrates that the presence of consumer reviews may generate undesirable incentives. A monopolist selling an experience good can manipulate anticipations of the product's quality, even with truthful reviews. Consumers with the heterogeneous preferences and cursed beliefs of Eyster and Rabin (2005) fail to take into account that past consumers self-select themselves into purchasing decisions, leading to excessively high anticipation of quality. Since the higher the price is, the higher is the self-selection bias, the monopolist can exacerbate this error by increasing the price. The monopolist charges a higher initial price than the corresponding myopic price which ignores the effect of pricing on learning. The presence of reviews may thus slow down the diffusion of new products. Addressing the motivation to post reviews, or the reliability of reviews based on their sample size (currently absent due to the continuum of consumers assumption) are some possible extensions of the model.
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Abstrakt
Když jsou spotřebitelé omezeně racionální, spotřebitelské recenze mohou mít zvrácené učinky zahrnující zpoždění v ujímání se nových produktů neznámé kvality. Pokud spotřebitelé opomíjejí,že u recenzentů došlo k samoselekci ohledně zakoupeníči nezakoupení produktu, monopolista může manipulovat přesvědčení spotřebitelů ohledně kvality produktu aktualizované po přečtení recenzí, protože cena produktu určuje zkreslení dané samoselekcí (tzv. self-selection bias). Monopolista nastaví relativně vysokou cenu, protože pozitivní samoselekce u počátečních kupců zvýší reportovanou kvalitu v jejich následných recenzích.
